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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
While incarcerated on death row in New Jersey, Marko 
Bey engaged in numerous "everyday" conversations with 
Corrections Officer Alexander Pearson. These discussions 
covered many different topics from sports, to women, to the 
news. In the course of their discourse, Bey confessed to the 
murders of two women. When Bey's death sentence was 
subsequently vacated and the convictions for the murder 
and sexual assault of one of the victims were reversed, the 
state introduced Pearson's testimony at the retrial, and Bey 
was again found guilty and this time received a sentence of 
life imprisonment. After Bey's convictions were affirmed on 
direct appeal, he sought relief in the district court. Bey now 
appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for 
habeas corpus relief. 
 
We hold that there was no violation of Bey's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel because there was no 
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deliberate elicitation of incriminating information for use in 
connection with his prosecution. We also hold that there 
was sufficient evidence at Bey's second trial to support the 
jury's findings of guilt. Thus, we will affirm the district 
court's judgment. 
 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The bruised and battered body of Cheryl Alston was 
found by a jogger on April 2, 1983, in a vacant lot across 
the boardwalk from the beach in Ocean Grove, Neptune 
Township, New Jersey. A police investigation ensued, and 
Bey was arrested on May 6, 1983. On December 13, 1983, 
he was convicted for the murder, felony murder, aggravated 
assault, and aggravated sexual assault of Alston and two 
days later was sentenced to death. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court vacated Bey's death sentence on August 2, 
1988, because he had been a juvenile at the time of the 
offense and was therefore not eligible for the death penalty. 
See State v. Bey I, 548 A.2d 846 (N.J. 1988). The Court also 
reversed the convictions, remanded the case, and ordered 
the suppression of Bey's confession to the police. 
 
In a separate prosecution, Bey was also convicted of 
murdering Carol Peniston in 1983. On the day that the New 
Jersey Supreme Court vacated Bey's convictions for the 
Alston murder, the Court also vacated the death sentence 
he received for the Peniston murder, but affirmed his 
conviction in that case, see State v. Bey II, 548 A.2d 887 
(N.J. 1988). Bey has since been again sentenced to death 
for the Peniston murder. See State v. Bey, 645 A.2d 685 
(N.J. 1994); State v. Bey, 610 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1992). 
 
In the course of the state's preparation for Bey's retrial 
in 1988, an investigator from the Monmouth County 
Prosecutor's Office interviewed some 12 or 13 corrections 
officers regarding Bey. He discovered that, in addition to 
the earlier confession to the police, Bey had made 
statements to Pearson while incarcerated in late 1983 and 
early 1984 at the Capital Sentencing Unit ("CSU") of the 
New Jersey State Prison in Trenton. In a statement taken 
September 19, 1988, Pearson told the investigator that 
shortly after Bey's arrival at the CSU he had "talked" with 
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Bey about "why he was here" and "why he did it." Bey had 
disclosed to him that he killed two women, one of whom he 
"raped and beat" "on the beach," and that he was "high" 
while committing the murders. 
 
Bey subsequently challenged the admissibility of 
Pearson's proposed testimony on Sixth Amendment 
grounds and a suppression hearing was held.1 At the 
hearing, Bey denied ever discussing the murders with 
Pearson, but Pearson reiterated the statements he had 
made to the investigator. Pearson also stated that he had 
never initiated a conversation about Bey's murders and had 
only discussed them when Bey brought up the subject. 
Pearson did, however, acknowledge asking Bey for 
clarification "if it was something I didn't understand." The 
only specific example of a question Pearson remembered 
asking about the murders was "I asked him why would he 
do that. What kind of mind you was in." Pearson also 
indicated that he was aware that Bey had an appeal 
pending and that he was represented by counsel. 
 
At the close of the suppression hearing, the court found 
that the structure of the CSU was such that the prisoners, 
as a practical matter, could not converse with one another. 
Thus, conversations could be conducted only with the 
guards. As a corrections officer on the CSU, Pearson was 
charged with the responsibility of keeping Bey in custody 
and safe. His responsibilities, according to the court, 
included talking to and observing Bey to detect any suicidal 
tendencies. The court also observed that the dialogue 
between Bey and Pearson "touched a whole host of topics," 
including sports, women, and "life in jail," but that on five 
to seven occasions "there was a discussion" about why Bey 
was incarcerated. The only question mentioned by the trial 
court was characterized as Pearson's having asked, "Why 
did it happen?" The response, according to the court, was 
"drugs or alcohol." The trial judge found that Pearson 
"never set out to gain information from Mr. Bey in the 
capacity of being a corrections officer; that they were 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Bey's motion to suppress his confession relied on both the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments. Before us, he relies exclusively on the Sixth 
Amendment. 
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talking, as he described it, man to man," and that "[i]t was 
the inmate who initiated the conversations." Furthermore, 
the court noted that Pearson made no report of his 
conversations with Bey prior to being interrogated five years 
after they occurred. Pearson's testimony was "found to be 
extremely credible, although reluctantly given." 
 
The trial judge concluded that the Miranda rule2 was not 
violated, that there was nothing about the setting that was 
coercive, and that Bey's statements were entirely voluntary. 
While the isolation in the unit could fairly be described as 
involving pressure to converse with a guard, there was no 
physical or psychological pressure to converse about 
incriminating subject matters. The trial judge observed that 
the conversations between the men "had nothing to do ... 
with whether or not the Court ultimately was going to 
overturn the conviction." The court ultimately ruled that 
Pearson's testimony would be allowed into evidence. 
 
At Bey's second trial, Pearson testified only that Bey told 
him that "he had beat [sic] and raped a woman on the 
beach" and that she "died." The jury did not hear from 
Pearson any information about drugs, alcohol, or any other 
motivation for the crime. 
 
The prosecution supplemented Bey's confession by 
offering the testimony of investigators from the prosecutor's 
offices of two other New Jersey oceanfront counties. The 
investigators confirmed that there had been no homicides of 
females in the vicinity of the beaches in either county 
between the defendant's return to New Jersey in March of 
19833 and his arrest in May of that year; the prosecution 
used this evidence to link Bey's statement that he had "beat 
and raped a woman on the beach" to Cheryl Alston's death, 
arguing that Bey's statement could refer to no other 
murder. The other evidence included: (1) police testimony 
and photographs describing the crime scene in which 
Alston's naked body had been found in a vacant lot across 
the boardwalk from the beach along with a "two-by-four," 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
3. In order to prevent the jury from hearing that Bey had been 
incarcerated and was paroled on March 19, 1983, the parties stipulated 
that he "resided" outside of the state of New Jersey prior to that date. 
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which had on it blood and hair later determined to match 
those of the victim; (2) testimony by the medical examiner 
that Alston died of blunt blows with a "two-by-four" 
instrument to the head, chest, and abdomen; (3) the 
testimony of a forensic scientist that a semen stain on the 
victim's discarded clothing was consistent with Bey's 
enzyme markings, but that spermatozoa removed from the 
victim's vagina was not; and (4) the testimony of another 
forensic scientist that the single set of footprints in the 
sand next to the body were the same "size," "pattern," and 
"make" as a pair of sneakers seized at the time of Bey's 
arrest at his mother's house 1.7 miles from the location of 
the crime scene. 
 
The jury convicted Bey once again of murder, felony 
murder, aggravated assault, and aggravated sexual assault. 
The court sentenced him to life imprisonment with a 30- 
year parole disqualifier for the murder count and a 
consecutive term of 20 years with a 10-year parole 
disqualifier for the aggravated sexual assault count, and 
imposed a $2,000 Violent Crime Compensation Board 
penalty. The felony murder and aggravated assault counts 
were merged. 
 
On appeal, the Appellate Division of New Jersey's 
Superior Court disagreed with the trial court's 
determination that Pearson was not acting as a "law 
enforcement agent" during his conversations with Bey. 
State v. Bey, 610 A.2d 403, 411-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1992). The court observed that a corrections officer is 
a law enforcement agent by statute in New Jersey, see 
N.J.S.A. 2A:154-4, that the guards were all encouraged to 
maintain good communication lines with the inmates as a 
suicide precaution, that it was hard for prisoners to 
communicate with one another, and that the "corrections 
officer was one of the few people they could have any daily 
contact with." Bey, 610 A.2d at 411. However, the Appellate 
Division held that the comments were not "deliberately 
elicited" by the state in violation of Bey's right to counsel. 
The court observed that the conversations were not 
knowingly designed to circumvent the protections of 
the Sixth Amendment as Pearson was not instructed to 
obtain any incriminating information from Bey, he never 
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prepared any reports about the information, there was no 
investigative or motivational nexus between the 
prosecutor's office and Pearson, and the state only 
discovered the confession to Pearson through the 
investigation of the prosecutor's office. Id. at 415. The court 
also rejected Bey's claim that the evidence at trial had been 
insufficient to support his conviction. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court denied certification. State v. Bey, 611 A.2d 
657 (N.J. 1992). 
 
The district court denied Bey's petition for habeas relief, 
holding that Pearson's casual discussions with Bey were 
not "deliberately designed to elicit statements from the 
defendant that would settle the outcome of the trial one 
way or another," and that the sum of the evidence was 
sufficient to support Bey's conviction. 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
In the briefing before us, Bey argued that we should 
conduct plenary review of the state court's conclusion that 
his Sixth Amendment right was not violated. See Miller v. 
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1985); Parry v. Rosemeyer, 
64 F.3d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
116 S. Ct. 734 (1996). The state, on the other hand, urged 
us to examine the decision under the more deferential 
standard articulated in 28 U.S.C. S 2254, as amended by 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"),4 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 2254(d) now provides: 
 
       An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
       custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
       granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 
       merits in the State court proceedings unless the adjudication of 
the 
       claim-- 
 
       (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 
       unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
       determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 
 
       (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 
       determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 
the 
       State court proceedings. 
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When this case was briefed, the federal courts had taken 
conflicting positions on whether the AEDPA's amendments 
were applicable in non-capital habeas corpus proceedings, 
like Bey's, that were pending at the time of the AEDPA's 
enactment. The Supreme Court has since resolved the 
debate, holding that the AEDPA's modifications to S 2254(d) 
and (e) do not apply in such circumstances. Lindh v. 
Murphy, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). Accordingly, 
we review Bey's petition under our prior plenary standard 
and are not required by the AEDPA to defer to the state 
court's conclusion on this legal issue.5  
 
III. RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
 
A. 
 
The Sixth Amendment, which is made applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 
U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 
470 (1981). The Amendment serves to safeguard the 
adversarial process by ensuring that once the right to 
counsel has attached the accused "need not stand alone 
against the State" at any "critical stage" of the aggregate 
proceedings against him. Id. at 470; see also United States 
v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 269 (1980). The purpose of the 
Sixth Amendment is to protect the "unaided layman," who 
"finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of 
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of 
substantive and procedural criminal law." United States v. 
Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 
406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). 
 
In a line of cases involving incriminating statements 
made to police informants, the Supreme Court has held 
that an individual who stands indicted of a crime is denied 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Of course, the underlying factual findings by the state court are 
entitled to a presumption of correctness. See  28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1995); 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1986); Pemberthy v. Beyer, 
19 F.3d 857, 864 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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his right to counsel when agents of the state circumvent 
that right by "deliberately elicit[ing]" inculpatory statements 
from him in the absence of his counsel, absent a voluntary 
and knowing waiver. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 
348-49 (1990); see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 
457 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 173 (1985); 
Henry, 447 U.S. at 270; Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 
201, 206 (1964). The deliberate elicitation doctrine was first 
recognized in Massiah, where the defendant, released on 
bail, made numerous incriminating statements to his 
codefendant, who had agreed to act as a government 
informant and had permitted the installation of a 
surveillance device in his automobile. Id. The Court 
concluded that the protections of the Sixth Amendment 
apply to "indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well 
as those conducted in the jailhouse" and held that the 
defendant's confession had been "deliberately elicited" by 
the police in violation of both the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments. Id. 
 
In Henry, the Court determined that the defendant's 
pretrial confession to a government informant who had 
been placed in the defendant's cell in order to listen to his 
comments should have been suppressed. 447 U.S. at 274. 
The Court applied Massiah's deliberate elicitation 
formulation, observing three relevant factors: (1) the paid 
informant was acting under the state's instructions and 
had an incentive to produce useful information; (2) the 
informant was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate; 
and (3) the defendant was in custody and under 
indictment. Id. at 270. Despite the government's specific 
instructions to merely listen to the defendant, the 
informant had "stimulated" conversations with the 
defendant. Id. at 273. The Court held that"[b]y 
intentionally creating a situation likely to induce[the 
defendant] to make incriminating statements without the 
assistance of counsel, the Government violated [the 
defendant]'s Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Id. at 274. 
The case was not one where " `the constable... blundered;' 
rather, it [was] one where the `constable' planned an 
impermissible interference with the right to the assistance 
of counsel." Id. at 275. 
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The Court also found a Sixth Amendment violation where 
the confession was obtained by an informant who agreed to 
wear a recording device in a meeting with a defendant out 
on bail. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180. The Court invoked 
Massiah and Henry and articulated the following principle: 
        [K]nowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to 
       confront the accused without counsel being present is 
       as much a breach of the State's obligation not to 
       circumvent the right to the assistance of counsel as is 
       the intentional creation of such an opportunity. 
       Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment is violated when the 
       State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly 
       circumventing the accused's right to have counsel 
       present in a confrontation between the accused and a 
       state agent. 
 
Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176. Where the police suggested that 
the informant wear the wire at the meeting with his 
codefendant and the police were aware that the meeting 
was for the "express purpose" of discussing the pending 
charges and trial defense, a Sixth Amendment violation 
occurred. Id. at 176-77. 
 
In Kuhlmann, on the other hand, the Court did not find 
a Sixth Amendment violation where an inmate had followed 
police instructions and had merely listened to the 
confession of his cellmate. 477 U.S. at 456. After the 
defendant's arraignment, the police placed him in the same 
cell with the informant for the express purpose of 
determining who the defendant's accomplices were. The 
defendant initially told the informant the same story he had 
given to the police, whereupon the informant advised him 
that his story "didn't sound too good." Later, the defendant 
related the actual events, an account which the informant 
surreptitiously noted in writing and rendered to the police. 
Id. at 440. The Court cited the Massiah and Henry 
decisions and observed that the "primary concern of the 
Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by 
investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct 
police interrogation." Id. at 459. The Court stated: 
 
       Since "the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever-- 
       by luck or happenstance--the State obtains 
 
                                10 
 
 
 
       incriminating statements from the accused after the 
       right to counsel has attached," a defendant does not 
       make out a violation of that right simply by showing 
       that an informant, either through prior arrangement or 
       voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to 
       the police. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate 
       that the police and their informant took some action, 
       beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately 
       to elicit incriminating remarks. 
 
Id. at 459 (citation omitted). Because the informant had not 
asked any questions but "only listened" to the defendant's 
"spontaneous" and "unsolicited" statements, no Sixth 
Amendment violation occurred. Id. at 460. 
 
In each case, those charged with Sixth Amendment 
violations were conducting, or working with others who 
were conducting, an investigation of crimes the defendant 
had been charged with committing. They were thus 
deliberately seeking to elicit information to be used in 
connection with the charges pending against the accused, 
the subject matter of the defendant's attorney-client 
relationship. In this line of cases, the Court struggled with 
the issue of whether there are any circumstances under 
which the state can deliberately undertake to secure 
incriminating information from a represented defendant in 
the absence of counsel and can thereafter use in court the 
incriminating information it obtains. The answer that has 
evolved is that it can, only if there is not "elicitation"--only 
if the government does no more than listen. See Kuhlmann, 
477 U.S. at 459. It cannot if the police or their informants 
question or otherwise encourage or facilitate the 
defendant's discussion of the crime, and this is true even if 
the defendant initiates the discussion of the criminal 
conduct. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 271-72. 
 
These strict rules are necessary in Massiah-type 
situations because the state has deliberately set out to 
secure information for use in a pending prosecution and 
because the accused, thinking he is communicating with a 
fellow inmate rather than a state investigator, is exercising 
no judgment as to whether counsel's advice should be 
sought. Under these circumstances, the risk of "dilut[ing] 
the protection afforded by the right to counsel" is great. 
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Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171; see Henry, 447 U.S. at 273 
("Conversation stimulated in such circumstances may elicit 
information that an accused would not intentionally reveal 
to persons known to be Government agents."). 
 
B. 
 
Bey also relies on another line of cases, those involving 
court-ordered examinations to obtain information relevant 
to the prosecution of the defendant's case. See Powell v. 
Texas, 492 U.S. 680 (1989); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 
249 (1988); Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987); 
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). In Estelle, the Court 
held that a defendant in a capital case has "a Sixth 
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel before 
submitting to [a] pretrial psychiatric interview" ordered by 
the court for the purpose of securing information for use in 
connection with the defendant's trial. Id. at 469.6 It followed 
that, if counsel was not notified of the interview and given 
the opportunity to advise his client on whether to submit to 
it, information secured from the defendant could not be 
used by the state at trial. Since the state had used the 
psychiatrist to prove future dangerousness at the penalty 
stage, the death penalty judgment had to be reversed. Id. at 
471. Accord Powell, 492 at 681-85 (finding violation of Sixth 
Amendment where defense counsel was not informed that 
competency and insanity examination would include issue 
of future dangerousness); Satterwhite, 486 at 252-55 
(holding defense counsel does not receive constructive 
notice of a mental examination and its scope through the 
filing of documents granting an ex parte motion for such an 
exam). Compare Buchanan, 483 at 424-25 (where defense 
counsel had raised mental status defense and had moved 
for a psychiatric examination, no Sixth Amendment 
violation occurred when court-ordered examination was 
used at trial to rebut the defense). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In Estelle, the purpose of the interview was to determine competence 
to stand trial, 451 U.S. at 456-57, whereas in Powell, it was for that 
purpose and to determine sanity at the time of the offense. 492 U.S. at 
681. The motivation for the evaluation in Satterwhite included both 
competency for trial and sanity at the time of the crime as well as future 
dangerousness. 486 U.S. at 252. 
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In the Estelle line of cases, as in Massiah, those acting on 
behalf of the state, i.e., the prosecutor, judge, and 
psychiatrist, were deliberately attempting to secure 
information from the defendant for use in connection with 
his prosecution. Accordingly, a similar risk of diluting the 
protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment existed in this 
line of cases. 
 
C. 
 
The critical distinction between this case and the 
Massiah and Estelle lines is that Pearson, while a state 
actor, was not a state actor deliberately engaged in trying to 
secure information from the defendant for use in 
connection with the prosecution that was the subject 
matter of counsel's representation. While it may be 
debatable whether any of the information used at trial was 
given by Bey in response to a question from Pearson, the 
state court found, based on undisputed facts, that no 
question asked by Pearson was part of an effort 
"deliberately designed to elicit incriminating remarks" for 
use against Bey. While it thus may not be clear whether 
there was an "elicitation" by Pearson, there certainly was no 
"deliberate elicitation" within the teachings of the cases Bey 
relies upon. 
 
Ordinarily, when a state agent converses with an indicted 
defendant under circumstances in which the agent should 
expect that incriminating information might be disclosed 
and such information is disclosed and is subsequently used 
in the prosecution, it can be presumed that there was a 
deliberate elicitation of information for use in connection 
with the case. The undisputed facts in this case, however, 
are simply inconsistent with a deliberate plan on the part 
of Pearson to garner information for use against Bey.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In an appropriate case, the trial court could preclude the prosecution 
from admitting a corrections officer's testimony into evidence. If a 
corrections officer's role requires conversations with inmates under 
circumstances in which inculpatory statements should be foreseen, the 
prosecution should expect to forego, at the subsequent trial of the 
inmate, the use of any statements elicited in those conversations, unless 
the inmate has been given Miranda warnings. 
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Pearson was known by Bey to be an employee of the 
state, not a fellow inmate or confederate. While the 
circumstances were such that Pearson should have 
anticipated that Bey would converse freely with him, given 
Pearson's status as a guard and the fact that he did little, 
if anything, to draw Bey out on the subject of his crimes, 
we question whether Pearson should have anticipated the 
confession which Bey volunteered. But even if we assume 
elicitation on Pearson's part, the undisputed facts do not 
support the hypothesis that Pearson intended to elicit 
information for use against Bey. First, Pearson had no 
responsibility for eliciting or reporting information for use 
in the prosecution of Bey's case and was not working with 
anyone who had such responsibility. Second, and most 
importantly, Pearson did not behave like someone who 
intended to secure incriminating statements from Bey. The 
record lacks evidence of any questions designed to elicit the 
statement that Bey had raped and beaten a woman to 
death on the beach, and merely reveals Pearson's asking 
"why" Bey had committed the act and seeking clarification 
"if it was something [he] didn't understand." Pearson did 
not take any notes or compile any reports of his 
conversations with Bey. Cf. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 440 
(informant surreptitiously recorded cellmate's statements in 
writing). In fact, Pearson disclosed the confession to no one 
for five years.8 It was only through the systematic efforts of 
the investigator that the prosecutor's office uncovered Bey's 
statements. Even Pearson's testimony in Bey's case was 
"reluctantly given." Thus, the state's receipt of Bey's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In this regard, we think Bey's case is similar to that of the jailhouse 
informant in United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1360 (7th Cir. 1990). 
The informant in York did not report to the FBI the information he had 
obtained through casual conversations with the defendant until several 
months after the discussions had occurred when he learned from a 
newspaper account that the defendant's conviction had been reversed. 
The Seventh Circuit observed that "[i]t is inconceivable that had these 
statements been the fruit of an attempt to deliberately elicit information 
from [the defendant] that [the informant] would not have reported them 
to [his FBI contact] at that time." Id. Similarly, there is no explanation 
for Pearson's failure to immediately convey his information to the 
prosecutor's office or even his supervisor, if he intended to elicit 
incriminating information from Bey. 
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confession was not the result of any deliberate elicitation by 
Pearson for use in connection with Bey's prosecution, and 
the state's use of Bey's confession at trial did not violate the 
Sixth Amendment.9 
 
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 
We also find no merit in Bey's sufficiency of the evidence 
challenge. Pearson's testimony, if credited, established that 
Bey had "beat[en] and raped a woman on the beach" and 
that she had "died." Investigators from the prosecutor's 
offices in two New Jersey oceanfront counties confirmed 
that there were no homicides of females in the vicinity of 
the beaches in their jurisdiction during the relevant time 
period; this evidence narrowed the possibility that Bey was 
confessing to the murder of someone other than Alston 
when he admitted that he had beaten and raped a woman 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Of course, any evidence of an additional legitimate reason for 
interviewing Bey would be irrelevant were we to determine that Pearson 
had deliberately acted to secure information for the prosecution. See 
Moulton, 474 U.S. at 178-80. The Court in Moulton rejected the state's 
argument that there was no Sixth Amendment violation because the 
police had a legitimate basis for their surveillance activities which was 
said to validate their conduct, i.e., they listened to the conversation in 
order to protect the informant from future harm and to investigate other 
crimes. As the Court concluded, "[b]ecause we hold that the ... police 
knowingly circumvented [the defendant]'s right to have counsel present 
at a confrontation between [the defendant] and a police agent, the fact 
that the police had additional reasons for recording[the defendant]'s 
meeting with [the informant] is irrelevant." Id. at 180. 
 
Moulton thus instructs that the state's knowing exploitation of an 
opportunity to secure incriminating statements from a counseled 
defendant in the absence of his attorney may not be "cured" merely 
because the state has a right to obtain information for other purposes. 
Id. at 178. Such is not the issue in our case, as the government is not 
claiming that Pearson acted deliberately to secure the information for the 
investigating authorities but was justified in doing so because they also 
needed it, for example, in order to monitor Pearson's performance of his 
suicide watch. Where there is no deliberate attempt to secure 
prosecution information, the admission of the statements does not 
"invit[e] abuse by law enforcement personnel in the form of fabricated 
investigations;" nor does it "risk the evisceration of the Sixth Amendment 
right recognized in Massiah." Id. at 180. 
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on a beach. Alston's naked and battered body was found 
just across the boardwalk from the beach with her bra 
wrapped around her neck. She died from severe blunt 
trauma caused by a two-by-four inch instrument matching 
the stick found at the scene, bearing her blood and hair. 
Articles of her clothing located at the scene were stained 
with sperm which was consistent with Bey's enzyme 
markers. The single set of footprints matched the"size," 
"pattern," and "make" of a pair of sneakers seized at the 
time of Bey's arrest from his mother's house less than two 
miles away from the location of the body. 
 
Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the 
state, as we must, we hold that Pearson's testimony and 
the other evidence that corroborates and supplements it 
provides a satisfactory basis for the jury's beyond a 
reasonable doubt verdict. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307, 318-19 (1979); Jackson v. Byrd, 105 F.3d 145, 147-48 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 2442 (1997). In 
reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of the fact 
that the sperm found in the victim's vagina did not match 
Bey's enzyme type. The jury was entitled to evaluate this 
fact in light of the forensic scientist's uncontested 
testimony that sperm may remain in the body for up to 48 
hours after sexual intercourse, although it is rarely 
discovered later than 16 hours after such activity. The jury 
was thus not required to conclude that this undisputed fact 
was inconsistent with Bey's guilt. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the district court. 
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